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I. The Modern Memex 
We still don’t have personal jetpacks or lunar clone colonies, but at least we got the 
memex. In 1945, Vannevar Bush, writing with the kind of foresight usually reserved 
for mystics and madmen, sketched a design for the dream desk of the future. Built 
around a microfilm archive, Bush’s design lets the user flip through data at will, 
following associations and creating new ones. The “intricate web of trails” in the 
researcher’s brain is mapped out in the annotations he makes, creating a permanent 
record of his discoveries: 
Wholly new forms of encyclopedias will appear, ready made with a 
mesh of associative trails running through them, ready to be dropped 
into the memex and there amplified. The lawyer has at his touch the 
associated opinions and decisions of his whole experience, and of the 
experience of friends and authorities. The patent attorney has on call the 
millions of issued patents, with familiar trails to every point of his client's 
interest. The physician, puzzled by a patient's reactions, strikes the trail 
established in studying an earlier similar case, and runs rapidly through 
analogous case histories, with side references to the classics for the 
pertinent anatomy and histology. The chemist, struggling with the 
synthesis of an organic compound, has all the chemical literature before 
him in his laboratory, with trails following the analogies of compounds, 
and side trails to their physical and chemical behavior.   2
Bush called this device the “memex,” but only because he had never seen a 
Bloomberg Terminal.  
In a way, any computer with an Internet connection is a memex that also plays 
cat videos, but in another, more accurate, way the Bloomberg Terminal is its true 
spiritual heir. Despite costing $1,500 a month to lease, or perhaps in part because of 
it, the Bloomberg Terminal is the magic sword that turns mere wheeler-dealers into 
Masters of the Universe   who execute trades with extreme prejudice. Bloomberg 3
users mainline real-time market data for anything anyone anywhere has ever done a 
deal in, engage in warlock-level feats of technical analysis, and enjoy unequalled 
access to breaking news, regulatory filings, industry reports, gossip, rumor, innuendo, 
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propaganda, and everything else that might possibly conceivably in some imaginable 
universe aﬀect the price of something worth buying or selling. The Terminal is 
absurdly customizable, helping traders track every last penny, piastre, and paisa of 
their portfolios. It even has restaurant reviews and shopping, both optimized for the 
1% of the 1% looking to blow some of the wealth they have just extracted from their 
fellow man. 
The Bloomberg Terminal, in short, is Big Data’s elite commando strike force. 
There have always been quants, with their artisanal small-batch hand-crafted voodoo 
finance. But the Bloomberg Terminal makes financial necromancy accessible to mere 
mortals. Imagine yourself granted entry to this Olympus of data, striding here and 
there, seeing connections, making associations, tasting the ambrosia of insight. And 
now imagine, if you will, that you are being watched. 
II. Hellhound on My Research Trail 
It’s not normally news when a crack addict stops coming around to his dealer. But 
when the addict is a partner at Goldman Sachs and the crack is the information 
flowing from his Bloomberg Terminal, that’s news.   A reporter thought to ring up 4
Goldman and inquire: is so-and-still with the firm? He hasn’t logged in to Bloomberg 
lately. It was a nice bit of journalistic tradecraft, except for one detail: the reporter 
worked for Bloomberg News, and knew about the partner’s terminal use because 
Bloomberg News employees had access to it. For years, they had been checking when 
persons of interest logged in, and what features they accessed.   “We were told again 5
and again and again, find ways to use what’s on the terminal to write stories.”    6
From there, things went pear-shaped in a hurry for Bloomberg. Goldman’s 
management called around to understand the extent of the snooping.   The rest of the 7
press found out, and wrote about the snooping with the gleeful ferocity of an athlete 
who has just discovered the syringes in his archrival’s locker.   Regulators from 8
Treasury and the Federal Reserve asked pointed questions about whether their 
employees had been spied on, too.   Bloomberg cut oﬀ its reporters’ access to terminal 9
usage information, and then, when that failed to stanch the reputational bleeding, 
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commissioned a nominally “independent” review of its privacy and security 
standards.   10
Some have downplayed the privacy implications, pointing out that Bloomberg 
reporters could see only general information about users’ activities, not specific 
searches and stocks.   They have a point, given the steady drumbeat of genuinely 11
serious privacy breaches in the news.   But even if in this particular case, Bloomberg’s 12
reporters stopped short of the most dastardly deeds they were technologically capable 
of, we should not let their restraint blind us to the full extent of the dastardry Big 
Data makes possible. 
We are accustomed to speaking about Big Data’s privacy concerns in terms of 
the surveillance it enables of data subjects.   Anyone high enough to take a ten-13
thousand-foot view can see over fences. Take a wide-angle shot, zoom and enhance, 
and you have a telephoto close-up. But consider now the user of the Bloomberg 
terminal, zipping from function to function, running down a hunch and preparing to 
make a killing. Perhaps he correlates historical chart data for energy-sector indices 
with news reports on international naval incidents in the Pacific Rim. He pulls 
patterns out of after-hours trading data, checking them against SEC filings and 
earnings calls. He has a theory, about what happens when certain shipbuilders report 
their quarterlies—two usually-coupled bond funds briefly diverge—and he stands 
ready to pocket some cash the next time it happens by exploiting this informational 
advantage with overwhelming financial force. Tell him that someone has been 
watching every keystroke, and you will see the blood drain from his face.  
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Or for more a more sympathetic figure, go back to Bush’s description of a 
memex user: 
The owner of the memex, let us say, is interested in the origin and 
properties of the bow and arrow. Specifically he is studying why the 
short Turkish bow was apparently superior to the English long bow in 
the skirmishes of the Crusades. He has dozens of possibly pertinent 
books and articles in his memex. First he runs through an encyclopedia, 
finds an interesting but sketchy article, leaves it projected. Next, in a 
history, he finds another pertinent item, and ties the two together. Thus 
he goes, building a trail of many items. Occasionally he inserts a 
comment of his own, either linking it into the main trail or joining it by 
a side trail to a particular item. When it becomes evident that the elastic 
properties of available materials had a great deal to do with the bow, he 
branches oﬀ on a side trail which takes him through textbooks on 
elasticity and tables of physical constants. He inserts a page of longhand 
analysis of his own. Thus he builds a trail of his interest through the 
maze of materials available to him.   14
For “bow and arrow,” substitute “genital herpes” or “radical politics.” For the 
historian, substitute a lawyer on a major case or a journalist on the City Hall beat. 
Think about all the people who might find some use in seeing your research trails: 
opposing counsel, corrupt police chiefs, lovers, rivals, frenemies, talk radio 
demagogues, creepy bosses, trolls, self-righteous prudes, kooks and zealots of every 
stripe, and that one petty-minded neighbor with a lot of grudges and a little time to 
kill. The memex is—it is designed to be—an externalized record of its user’s every 
thought. Using it is like plugging yourself into the most perfect brain scanner ever 
devised. If you care, even just the slightest bit, about your intellectual freedom, then 
you, I submit, are very interested in who has access to your memex and the memories 
it holds.   Big Data puts the world at your fingertips—so with Big Data, your 15
fingerprints are everywhere. 
Big Data’s other privacy problem is like its first privacy problem, and also unlike 
it. Subject privacy is about actions: Big Data knows what you did last summer. User 
privacy is about thoughts: Big Data knows you watched I Know What You Did Last 
Summer. With enough such data points, it can make a pretty good guess what you’re 
likely to do next summer. Google searches have been used to convict murderers; how 
long before they’re used as evidence of pre-crime?   Oh, wait, they already are: the 16
    Bush, supra note 1.14   
    See, e.g., Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008).15    
    See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Police Blotter: Web Searches Lead to Murder Conviction, CNET (Feb. 12, 16   
2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10452471-38.html.
   Big Data’s Other Privacy Problem [Draft5
NSA tells analysts to find targets by identifying people “searching the web for 
suspicious stuﬀ.”   Search-query signature strikes cannot be far oﬀ. 17
Indeed, Big Data is recursive: it tends inevitably to convert its users into its 
subjects. How does Google map flu trends? Not by testing people for infection, but 
seeing who searches for information about flu.   Every visitor to the Land of Data 18
leaves a little of herself behind. Every query is further grist for the mill. Even 
Vannevar Bush, writing in 1945, bless his prescient and naive heart, understood this 
much: 
The historian, with a vast chronological account of a people, 
parallels it with a skip trail which stops only on the salient items, and can 
follow at any time contemporary trails which lead him all over 
civilization at a particular epoch. There is a new profession of trail 
blazers, those who find delight in the task of establishing useful trails 
through the enormous mass of the common record. The inheritance 
from the master becomes, not only his additions to the world's record, 
but for his disciples the entire scaﬀolding by which they were erected. 
He might have added that we will all be trailblazers, that the greatest value of the 
memex—its permanent and globally shared record of every user’s research trails—is 
precisely its greatest curse. We are the spiders spinning Big Data’s web of knowledge, 
and we are also the flies trapped in it.   He who works with data should look to it that 19
he himself does not become data. And when you gaze long into Big Data, Big Data 
also gazes into you.   20
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III. Mutually Assured Privacy Destruction 
There is another way of understanding the relationship between Big Data subjects 
and Big Data users. The fact that users also have privacy interests at stake complicates 
the project of protecting subject privacy. To understand the problem, it helps to 
understand something of the debate over how what to do about safeguarding those 
whose personal information has been hoovered up at terabyte scale. 
For a time, it appeared that no restrictions on use might be necessary because 
there were no data subject privacy interests at stake. Deidentification was the 
watchword of the day: it was thought that some simple scrubbing—stripping a 
dataset of names, ranks, and serial numbers—would render these data driftnets 
dolphin-safe. And the database wranglers would have gotten away with it, too, if it 
hadn’t been for those meddling computer scientists.   Personal information always 21
contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in an IP address, and a 
very modest grade of data has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. 
That something he may be reidentified from, unless there is a restriction in access to 
the database. Although there is a lively dispute about where to draw the balance 
between the needs of the many (as data subjects) and the needs of the many (as 
research beneficiaries), it is by now painfully clear that some such balance must be 
struck.   22
The next line of defense, implicit in the burgeoning discourse of Big Data 
boosterism, is that only incorruptible researchers who are pure of heart will be 
plowing through the piles of data in search of ponies. Epidemiologists are the poster 
children, perhaps because public health oﬃcials would never, ever jump to 
conclusions about poorly understood diseases sweeping through their communities. 
This ideal of a trusted elite priesthood of data analysts bears an uncanny similarity to 
National Rifle Association head Wayne LaPierre’s invocation of “good guys with 
guns.”   When Big Data is outlawed, only outlaws will have Big Data. Actuaries and 23
supply chain optimizers, perhaps, come close to this technocratic ideal. 
But Big Data today is probably better embodied by marketers and hedge-fund 
traders, two professions not known for their generous concern for human flourishing. 
It is hard to feel sanguine about the Big Swinging Dicks   who brought us the 24
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subprime financial Chernobyl or about ad men in the business of running A/B tests to 
optimize their manipulation of consumers’ cognitive biases.   Any suﬃciently 25
advanced marketing technology is indistinguishable from blackmail. The global 
phishing industry shows what happens when confidence men scale up their scams. 
And all of this is to say nothing about Carnivore, Total Information Awareness, 
PRISM, EvilOlive, and the other ominously-named trappings of the National 
Surveillance State.   Give the CIA six megabytes of metadata inadvertently emitted 26
by the most honest of men, and it will find something in them to put him on the 
drone kill list. One might—as the Obama Administration asks—simply trust in the 
good faith and minimal competence of the Three Letter Agencies that brought us 
extraordinary rendition, COINTELPRO, and the Clipper Chip. Or, more 
realistically, one might question the wisdom of creating comprehensive fusion centers 
accessible to every vindictive cop with a score to settle.   27
Thus, since Big Data cannot be entirely defanged and its users cannot be entirely 
trusted, it becomes necessary to watch them at work. It seems like a natural enough 
response to the problem of the Panopticon. Subject privacy is at risk because Big Data 
users can hide in the shadows as they train their telescopes not on the stars but on 
their neighbors. And so we might say, turn the floodlights around: ensure that there 
are no dark corners from which to spy. We would demand audit trails—permanent, 
tamper-proof records of every query and computation. 
But if we are serious about user privacy as well as about subject privacy, 
transparency is deeply problematic. The audit trails that are supposed to protect Big 
Data subjects from abuse are themselves a perfect vector for abusing Big Data users.  28
Indeed, they are doubly sensitive, because they are likely to contain sensitive 
information about both subjects and users. The one-way vision metaphor of the 
Panopticon, then, is double-edged. Think about glasses. A common intuition is that 
mirrorshades are creepy, because the wearer can see what he chooses without 
revealing where his interest lies. Everyone is up in arms about the Google Glass-holes 
who wear them into restrooms. But the all-seeing Eye is a window to the soul. The 
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Segway for your face is also a camera pointed directly at your brain that syncs all its data 
to the cloud. The assumption Glass users are making, presumably, is that no one else 
will have access to their data, and so no one else will be pondering what they’re 
pondering. But that’s what Bloomberg Terminal users thought, too. 
This leaves meta-oversight: watching the watchmen. Audit trails don’t need to 
be public; access to them could be restricted to a small and specialized group of 
auditors. But this privacy epicycle introduces complications of its own. You have a 
security problem, so you audit your users. Now you have two security problems: you 
are committed to safeguarding and watching over not just your data, but your data 
about how your data is being used. Whoever looks through the logfiles will be able to 
gain remarkable insight into users’ methods and madnesses. Yes, the auditors will be 
looking for suspicious access patterns, but they’ll need to have access to the full, 
sensitive range of information. You wouldn’t want an insider trading scandal in which 
an auditor piggybacked on an analyst’s research, or a auditor who picks a favorite user 
and turns into a stalker. Your auditors, in other words, are also Big Data users, which 
means that they too will have to be audited. It’s watchmen all the way down. 
IV. Crowdsourcing and Power 
This convergence between Big Data’s two privacy problems brings home the degree 
to which the Big Data story is a story of centralized control. It is the accumulation of 
large repositories of data that makes comprehensive surveillance possible, on both 
sides. When data is lying about raw, in the wild, any forager can pluck some, but the 
risks are necessarily limited. When that same data has been harvested, processed, and 
warehoused, two things change. First, it becomes far more threatening to the subjects, 
precisely because the accumulation of details harmless in themselves can make 
patterns evident. And second, it becomes necessary, to restrict access to the data: not 
just anyone can be allowed to run queries against it with anonymous impunity. 
That is, centralizing data disempowers both subjects and users. They are both 
now subject to the policies—or, perhaps, “whims”—of whatever entity controls the 
dataset. Data ownership is power, of a peculiarly feudal ilk. The data barons of 
Silicon Valley struggle to ensure that data about people comes to rest in their own 
servers. Whomsoever would work these vast tracts of data to harvest insight must do 
the data barons homage. By what feudal incidents does one become a data vassal? 
Socage, of course—payment in coin—but also data service—giving up yet more 
information about oneself. The synoptic view that Big Data aﬀords is not, it turns 
out, something that will be widely shared. That, the barons will hoard for themselves. 
Big Data doesn’t just grow on trees; it isn’t natural or inevitable. It describes a 
particular configuration of institutional relationships among data’s subjects, users, and 
owners, one in which concatenation and concentration give a small set of actors 
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disproportionate power to determine who knows what about whom.   This is a form 29
of ideology: that there are invaluable insights available in datasets so large they can 
only be eﬀectively managed by centralized repositories. This ideology of Big Data is 
explicitly used to justify overriding the privacy concerns of its subjects,   and it has 30
the side eﬀect of putting its users in a position where they are subject to the 
observation and control of the data barons. Not just privacy law, but intellectual 
property law, contract law, unauthorized access law, and many other bodies of 
decidedly non-neutral doctrine are used to create a world in which data is always 
collected and rarely distributed.   This novus ordo datorum serves the interests of 31
autocrats, bureaucrats, and secret police; it appeals to data-addicted technologists and 
venture capitalists on the prowl for their next Internet-scale score. But—for all the 
insights that Big Data oﬀers—we can question whether its arrangements are as good 
for the rest of us. 
Perhaps there is another way. Consider a diﬀerent possible ideal for managing 
our relationship to information. Call it Small Data, or Local Data, or Slow Data, or 
Sustainable Data, or perhaps Democratic Data—enough to go around, enough for 
everyone to have some. Not perhaps, a lot, but enough. Enough not to be beholden 
to anyone else, enough to participate meaningfully in society, enough that no one can 
take away your dignity. Democratic Data is not the opposite of Big Data: these 
yeoman dataholders will join together their datasets at times to serve the public good, 
but they will be ever mindful of the risk of data tyranny.   Alexander Hamilton 32
would have loved Big Data, with its Enlightenment ambitions, brutally rational 
economics, and awe-inspiring centralized power. Democratic Data is more of a 
Thomas Jeﬀerson kind of idea—civic, romantic, uplifting, a little contradictory, and 
faintly impractical. Perhaps this might mean giving up the Bloomberg Terminal, or 
dividing out its functions and sharing access to some of them more widely. But 
would we want to live in a world that sets these ideals aside, rather than seeking, 
however fitfully and imperfectly, to realize a Republic of Data, where all men and 
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women are created equal, and are endowed by their databases with certain unalienable 
rights, among them life, liberty, and the pursuit of privacy?
